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Payday Lending in North Carolina: Now You See It, Now You
Don't

I. INTRODUCTION

"With a family to feed and no money for groceries, Navy
Yeoman 2nd Class Damon LaForce recently" visited one of the
many payday lending businesses located around the country.1
"LaForce wrote the lender a postdated check for $300. Five
2
minutes later, the sailor walked out with $255 cash in his pocket.,
LaForce, a few weeks after his initial loan from the payday lender,
then took out another loan to pay off the first advance. In total,
LaForce paid $150 in fees and interest for a $255 advance. 4 Payday
lenders "can be both a blessing and a curse" for people who
cannot, or choose not to, obtain credit from mainstream lenders.5
The payday lending industry has recently experienced incredible
growth-growing from $10 billion in volume in 2000 to $25 billion
in volume in 2003.6 Payday lending was once said to be "the fastest
growing segment of the fringe banking economy."7 Now, however,
significant federal and state regulation may have suppressed the
rapid growth of the payday lending industry.8 According to the
1. Thomas Watkins, Payday Lending Under Attack, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Sept. 1, 2006, available at http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/other-business/
article/0,2777,DRMN_23916_4960668,00.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Michael A. Stegman, The Public Policy Challenges of Payday Lending, 66
POPULAR GOV'T 16 (2001) [hereinafter Stegman, The Public Policy Challenges of
Payday Lending] available at http://www.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/assets/documents/
CCpaydayLending.pdf.
6. KEITH ERNST ET AL., CFR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE
ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY PAYDAY LENDING 2 (2004), available at

http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/CRLpaydaylendingstudyl2l8O3.pdf.
7. Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney Gen., New York Sues to Stop
Illegal Payday Lending Scheme (Sept. 24, 2003), available at http://www.oag
.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/sep24a_03.html.
8. See Letter from the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (FDIC) (Feb. 25, 2005), available
at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2005/fill405a.html
(noting
FDIC
requirement that banks ensure that payday loans are not made to customers who
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Center for Responsible Lending, payday lending costs consumers
an estimated $3.4 billion each year.9 In 1999 alone, "payday
lending in North Carolina completed more than 2.9 million
,"
transactions totaling approximately $535 million in loans .... 10
On December 22, 2005, Commissioner of Banks, Joseph A.
Jr.,
put an end to "rent-a-charter"'1 payday lending in North
Smith,
Carolina by holding that the practice violated the North Carolina
The North Carolina State Banking
Consumer Finance Act.
Commission subsequently affirmed this decision." Part II of this
Note provides an overview of payday lending and examines how
out-of-state banks exported interest rates to North Carolina under
the rent-a-charter or agency framework. The history of payday
lending in North Carolina is examined in the third section. 5 Part
IV reviews the North Carolina Commissioner of Banks' decision
to end the rent-a-charter or agency method of payday lending in
North Carolina. 16 Part V looks at the similarities between the
North Carolina Commissioner of Banks' decision and the Georgia
case BankWest v. Baker.'7 Ultimately, the Note concludes with the
theory that the Commissioner appears to be expanding the
BankWest argument in a way that it could be used in states without
have had payday loans outstanding from any lender for a total of three months out of
the previous twelve months). Payday lending has also been limited in certain states
like Georgia. See also BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D. Ga.
2004).
9. ERNST ET AL., supra note 6, at 2.
10. Stegman, The Public Policy Challenges of Payday Lending, supra note 5, at
17.
11. See infra notes 44-58 and accompanying text. The "rent-a-charter" method of
payday lending allows in-state payday lending companies to make loans under the
charters of out-of-state banks. Id. As such, payday lenders are able to take
advantage of high usury ceilings and make loans at rates exponentially higher than
allowed by in-state usury and consumer protection laws. Id.
12. In re Advance Am., Cash Advance Centers of N.C., Inc., No. 05:008:CF, 5354 (Comm'r of Banks, Dec. 22, 2005) (order), availableat http://www.nccob.org/NR/
rdonlyres/AF33D27C-2D74-40D5-88BE-E701BO31DDB4/0/43_AANCFINALORD
ER122205.pdf; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-164 (2005).
13. In re Appeal of Advance Am., Cash Advance Centers of N.C., Inc., No.
05:008:CF, 1 (Comm'r of Banks, May. 24, 2006) (final agency decision), available at
http://www.nccob.org/NR/rdonlyres/F3A69A8A-CE9A-4E3C-8A8D-05068774962D/
0/44_AppealofAdvanceAmerica.pdf.
14. See infra notes 18-74 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 75-116 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 117-60 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 161-94 and accompanying text.
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the Georgia statute and may have far-reaching effects in shutting
down the rent-a-charter business by payday lending shops.
II. AN

A.

OVERVIEW OF PAYDAY LENDING AND THE EXPORTING OF
INTEREST RATES

The Basics of Payday Lending
"Payday loans .

.

. are small, short-term, unsecured loans

that borrowers promise to repay out of their next paycheck or
regular income payments." 8 To obtain a loan, borrowers typically
post-date a check for the amount of cash they need plus the fee
charged by the lender. 9 The payday lender then gives the
borrower the principal of the loan in cash minus the loan fee.2°
Because the loan matures on the borrower's next payday, they are
referred to as "payday loans., 2' The annual percentage rate
(APR) is 22very high on payday loans because of the short time until
maturity.
Due to the short term of the loan, payday loans are
typically extremely expensive for borrowers.23 Payday loans rarely
quote interest rates; rather lenders frequently charge a
predetermined fee.24

Once this fee is converted to an annual

percentage rate, a consumer could potentially be paying as much
as 6,205% for using a payday loan. 2' For example, a borrower may
write a check to a payday lender in the amount of $117.26 The
borrower would then take $100 in cash and leave $17 with the

18. FDIC, GUIDELINES FOR PAYDAY LENDING, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/

safety/payday/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2006).
19. ERNST ET AL., supra note 6, at 2.

20. Id.
21. BankWest v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1339 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
22. FDIC, supra note 18.
23. In re Advance Am., Cash Advance Centers of N.C., Inc., No. 05:008:CF, 5354 (Comm'r of Banks, Dec. 22, 2005) (order), availableat http://www.nccob.org/NR/
rdonlyres/AF33D27C-2D74-40D5-88BE-E701BO31DDB4//43_AANCFINALORD
ER122205.pdf. Often the APR on payday loans tops 400%. Id.
24. CONSUMER CREDIT DIV., IND. DEP'T OF FIN. INST., PAYDAY LOANS = COSTLY
CASH, availableat http://www.in.gov/dfi/education/payday-loans.htm (last visited Jan.

6, 2007).
25. Id.
26. In re Advance Am., No. 05:008:CF, at 7.
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lender as the fee for the loan.27 If the term for this loan was two
weeks, the typical term for a payday loan, the annual percentage
rate would amount to an astounding 443.21%.28
Payday loans also have a reputation for creating a
relentless debt cycle that many consumers are unable to break.29
Some commentators suggest that ninety cents of every dollar made
by the payday lending industry comes from consumers caught in
the payday lending debt cycle. 30 With such high interest rates
many borrowers take out several additional payday loans in order
to pay off their initial loan. 3' The Center for Responsible Lending
suggests that, on average, the typical borrower takes out 8.1
payday loans each year.32 For instance:
[One woman] ... took out her first loan when faced
with a family emergency and was still paying to roll
the loan over every payday three years later. At
first, this 36-year-old woman viewed her payday
loan as a safe and easy way to obtain "free money."
For the next three years, she paid the interest but
was unable to repay the balance in a cycle that she
could not end. Over the life of the $300 loan, she
paid a total of $4,130 ($17.65 per $100 x 3 x 78
renewals). She still owes the principal.33
Statistics show that "91% of payday loans are made to
borrowers who receive five or more loans per year." 34 As such, the
woman in the previous example does not appear to be unique.
However, recent guidelines imposed by the FDIC require
institutions to set a "cooling off" period between payday loans,

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Nat'l Endowment for Fin. Educ., The Debt Cycle: Using Payday Loans to
Make Ends Meet (2002), http://www.nefe.org/pages/whitepaperpaydayloans.html.
30. Karen L. Werner, Payday Lenders Collect $4.2 Billion in 'Excessive' Fees,
Center Says in Report, 87 BANKING REP. 855 (Dec. 12, 2006).
31. Id.
32. ERNST ET AL., supra note 6, at 10.
33. Nat'l Endowment for Fin. Educ., supra note 29.
34. ERNST ET AL., supra note 6, at 7.
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and to set a maximum number of payday loans a customer can
take out each calendar year."
Many opponents of the payday lending industry claim that
payday lenders intentionally target distinct segments of the
population.36 The payday lending industry has been charged with
targeting minorities, low-income earners, military personnel, and
the elderly.37 One study "found that lower-income counties were
more likely to have a higher density of payday lending stores than
higher-income counties. 3 8 A recent report from the Department
of Defense estimates that 225,000 military service members have
used payday loans.39 That amounts to 17% of the entire United
States military." Navy personnel with debt more than 30% of
their income are prohibited from deploying overseas because their
financial troubles may make them vulnerable to bribery. 41
President Bush recently signed into law the John Warner National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Act).42 The Act
caps the annual percentage rate (APR) that may be charged to a
member of the military at 36%

.4

The state of Missouri just

recently forced dozens of nursing homes to quit running payday
lending operations." Ultimately, Jean Ann Fox, Director of
Consumer Protection for the Consumer Federation of America

35. FDIC, supra note 18.
36. Tom Feltner & Marva Williams, New Terms for Payday Loans: High Cost
Lenders Change Loan Terms to Evade Illinois Consumer Protections, 25
WOODSTOCK INST. 1, 5 (2004), available at http://woodstockinst.org/document/
alert_25.pdf.
37. Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney Gen., supra note 7.
38. Feltner & Williams, supra note 36, at 4.
39. DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED AT
13 (2006),
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Report-to-Congress-final.pdf.
40. Id.
41. Watkins, supra note 1.
42. John Warner Nat'l Def. Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No.
109-364, 120 Stat. 2083 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 987).
43. Id. A member of the military is defined as a member on active duty or active
guard or reserve duty. Id. The banking industry fears that this law may encourage
other activists to seek lending limits for other groups. See Stacy Kaper, Lobbyist
Face Hard Task on Military APR Provision, AM. BANKER., Oct. 20,2006.
44. RTOOnline.com, Missouri Governor Blunt Bans Employer Payday Loan
Programs in Nursing Homes, http://www.rtoonline.com/Content/Article/Sep_06/
PaydayLoansNursingHomesMissouri09l306.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
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concludes that "[p]ayday loan customers are those unable to exert
enough market pressure to protect themselves."45
B.

The "Rent-a-Charter"Method of Payday Lending

National payday lending companies typically use in-state
agents to carry out their business in states where lending laws are
particularly stringent.46 "In states with no enabling legislation for
payday lending, some payday [lending] stores operate as agents for
banks ... located in states without restrictive usury limits. Under

this arrangement, the bank is said to be 'renting its charter' and
'exporting its usury ceiling.'

47

Federal law allows banks to charge

interest rates permitted in their home state to all consumers
regardless of where they reside around the country.48 Payday
lending services typically partner with banks located in Delaware
and South Dakota because these states place no cap on interest
rates. 49 The rent-a-charter or agency method effectively allows
lenders to avoid state caps on interest rates by conducting business
under more profitable usury laws of other states. 0
Interest rates in North Carolina are capped at 36% for
licensed lenders" and 16% for unlicensed lenders.52 However, by
using the rent-a-charter method, payday lenders located in North
Carolina charge interest rates much higher than the 36% and 16%
allowed by North Carolina usury and consumer protection laws.53
45. Nat'l Endowment for Fin. Educ., supra note 29.
46. See, e.g., In re Advance Am., Cash Advance Centers of N.C., Inc., No.
05:008:CF, 9 (Comm'r of Banks, Dec. 22, 2005) (order), available at
http://www.nccob.org/NR/rdonlyres/AF33D27C-2D74-40D5-88BE-E701BO31D DB4/
0/43 AANCFINALORDER122205.pdf.
47. MARK FLANNERY & KATHERINE SAMOLYK, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
CHICAGO, PAYDAY LENDING: DO THE COSTS JUSTIFY THE PRICE? 4 (2005),

http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/2005-confpaper sessionlflannery.pdf.
48. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000) (national banks); 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (2000) (state
banks). "The National Bank Act and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act allow banks
to charge any customer the interest rates allowed in their home state." FLANNERY &
SAMOLYK, supra note 47, at 3.
49. FLANNERY & SAMOLYK, supra note 47, at 3.
50. See Rob Blackwell, Congress Cheers, Jeers FDIC on Payday Lending, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 21, 2003.
51. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-173 (2005).
52. § 24-1.1.
53. See Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, Schumer Warns Capital
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For example Advance America Cash Advance Centers of North
Carolina, Inc. (AANC), a North Carolina payday lender, charged
interest rates ranging from 443.21% to 521.43%.14 Furthermore,
the out-of-state bank generally has no other connection to the instate payday lender other than renting out its charter.5 In a typical
rent-a-charter agreement, the payday lender agrees to maintain
and staff its stores, conduct marketing and advertising for the cash
centers, accept and process applications, disburse loan proceeds,
and collect the loans.56 Within a few days, the bank generally sells
up to 95% of the participation of the loan back to the payday
lender.57 Essentially, the bank is charging the payday lender a 5%
fee for lending under the bank's charter." For example, AANC
contracted with Peoples National Bank of Paris, Texas to use its
charter in exchange for 10.08% of the gross revenue while AANC
retained the remaining 89.92% of the profits.59 Congress has
suggested that the rent-a-charter loophole "undermine[s]
traditional state authority to regulate small loans, expose[s]
consumers to abusive lending practices, and create[s] a competitive
disadvantage for other local lenders." 6
C.

Payday Lending in the United States- The Trend Toward
Regulation

The payday lending industry experienced rapid initial
growth. 6' From an industry that "was virtually nonexistent a

Region Military Families to Beware of Payday Loan Scams that Prey on Soldiers &
Rip them off with 900% Interest (Aug. 3, 2004), http://www.senate.gov/-schumer/
SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press-releases/2004/PR02797.paydayalbany080304.html.
54. In re Advance Am., Cash Advance Centers of N.C., Inc., No. 05:008:CF, 7, 12
(Comm'r of Banks, Dec. 22, 2005) (order), available at http://www.nccob.org/NR/
rdonlyres/AF33D27C-2D74-40D5-88BE-E701BO31DDB4/0/43_AANCFINALORD
ER122205.pdf.
55. See, e.g., id. at 14.
56. See, e.g., id.
57. Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, supra note 53.
58. Id.
59. In re Advance Am., No. 05:008:CF, at 12.
60. Letter from U.S. House of Rep. Comm. on Fin. Serv., to Donald E. Powell,
Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Mar. 18, 2003), available at http://www.house
.gov/apps/list/press/ba3l_democrats/paydaylending.pdf.
61. ERNST ET AL., supra note 6, at 2.
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decade ago, 62 the payday lending industry, by 2000, grew into a
national network that cashed more than 180 million checks a year
with a face value of $55 billion. 63 The payday loan industry was
estimated to be involved in "65 million transactions to [eight] to
''4
[ten] million households generating $2.4 billion in fee revenue.
Some scholars estimated that there were approximately 10,000
check cashing outlets located in the United States.65 Some states
were said to have more payday lending stores than they had
Burger King and McDonald's restaurants combined. 66
The high-risk nature and the substantial growth of the
payday lending industry has led to more state and federal
restrictions.67 "Payday lending raises many consumer protection
issues and attracts a great deal of attention from consumer
advocates and other regulatory organizations ... ."68 For example,
in March of 2005, the FDIC issued extensive guidelines for banks
that engage in the payday lending business. 69 These guidelines
allow the FDIC to examine payday lenders and their relationship
with in-state agents,7° and, as noted earlier, the restrictions limit
the number of payday loans a consumer can obtain in a calendar
year.
Furthermore, the state of Georgia has a statute that
"restricts in-state payday stores from acting as agents for out-ofstate banks in one, limited circumstance: where the agency
agreement grants the in-state agent 'the predominate economic
interest' in the bank's payday loan, which . .. means that the

62. Id.
63. Michael A. Stegman, Banking the Unbanked: Untapped Market Opportunities
for North Carolina's Financial Institutions, 5. N.C. BANKING INST. 23, 28 (2001)
[hereinafter Stegman, Banking the Unbanked].
64. JEAN ANN Fox, CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., RENT-A-BANK PAYDAY LENDING:
How BANKS HELP PAYDAY LENDERS EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS 6

(2001), http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/paydayreport.pdf.
65. Stegman, Banking the Unbanked, supra note 63, at 29.
66. Michael Stegman & Robert Faris, Payday Lending: A Business Model that
Encourages Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON.DEV. QUARTERLY 8, 9 (2003), available at
http://www.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/assets/documents/CCPayday-lending.pdf#search
=%22Payday%20AND %20Lender%2OAnd %20Burger%2OAnd%20King%22.
67. See FDIC, supra note 18.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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payday stores hold more than 50% of the revenues from the
loan., 72 Also, as noted earlier, President Bush recently signed into
law a bill that limits the interest rates that can be charged to active
and reserve military personnel.73 The state and federal reaction to
this booming industry suggests a trend towards more regulation. 4
III.

THE HISTORY OF PAYDAY LENDING IN NORTH CAROLINA

Prior to October 1, 1997, North Carolina law did not
expressly permit the making of payday loans.75 During this period,
all short-term loans were subject to the North Carolina Finance
Act and North Carolina's usury laws.76 On October 1, 1997, the
North Carolina General Assembly passed the North Carolina
Check Cashing Act (NCCCA).77 This Act permitted payday loans
in North Carolina but required that they be no more than $300
including fees, contain a maturity date not more than thirty-one
days after the loan was issued, and required that the total fees not
exceed 15% of the face value of the check. 78 Furthermore, the
NCCCA required that all payday lenders be licensed by the state
of North Carolina as check cashers. 79 The NCCCA contained a
"sunset date" of July 31, 2001.80 The North Carolina General
assembly extended this date until August 31, 2001; however, the
NCCCA was allowed to expire on August 31, 2001. 8' During this

72. BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F.3d 1289, 1293 (11th Cir. 2005).
73. John Warner Nat'l Def. Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No.
109-364, 120 Stat. 2083 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 987).
74. Elizabeth Willoughby, Note, BankWest, Inc. v. Baker: Is it Mayday for
Payday Lenders in Rent-A-Charter Arrangements?, 9 NC BANKING INST. 269, 287
(2005).
75. In re Advance Am., Cash Advance Centers of N.C., Inc., No. 05:008:CF, 6
(Comm'r of Banks, Dec. 22, 2005) (order), available at http://www.nccob.org/NR/
rdonlyres/AF33D27C-2D74-40D5-88BE-E701BO31DDB4/0/43_AANCFINALORD
ER122205.pdf.
76. Id. at 6. Licensed lenders are allowed to charge interest rates no higher than
thirty-six percent. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-276 (2005). Unlicensed lenders are allowed to
charge interest rates no higher than sixteen percent. § 24-1.1.
77. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-276 (2005).
78. § 53-281(b-d) (1999) (repealed).
79. Id.

80. In re Advance Am., No. 05:008:CF, at 7.
81. Id.
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with payday lending, payday lenders

operated under the "standard business model."8'3 Under the
standard business model, payday lenders were properly licensed,
used their own funds to loan money, and acted in accord with the
regulations set forth in the North Carolina Check Cashing Act.
The expiration, on August 31, 2001, of the NCCCA did not
put an end to the payday lending industry in North Carolina.85
While some payday lenders did cease operations, others kept their
doors open by using other designs. 6 Some entities, for example,
employed leasing and Internet service schemes.
One "[f]ormer
payday lender operated an Internet service 'rebate' scheme where
customers received an instant cash 'rebate' that had to be repaid
through a long-term Internet contract." 88 The courts looked at this
transaction and determined it was essentially a guise for a payday
lending business and held that it violated North Carolina usury
laws, the North Carolina Consumer Finance Act, and was an
unfair and deceptive trade practice. 9 Another payday lender
attempted to operate a payday lending operation under the pretext
of a leasing company. 90 The company would buy property from a
consumer and then lease it back to him or her in exchange for a
small loan. 9' A North Carolina judge put an end to this practice in

82. Press Release, Roy Copper, N.C. Att'y Gen., Payday Lending on the Way out
in NC, at 4 (Mar. 1, 2006), http://www.ncdoj.com/DocumentStreamerClient?directory
=PressReleases/&file=paydaylenders3.06.pdf#search=%22Payday%201ending%20N
orth%20Carolina%22.
83. In re Advance Am., No. 05:008:CF, at 7.
84. Id.
85. Press Release, Roy Cooper, supra note 82, at 4.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. State ex rel. Cooper v. NCCS Loans, Inc. 624 S.E.2d 371, 374 (N.C. Ct. App.
2005). The court determined that the Internet service transactions were essentially
the same as the payday loan transaction. Id. at 375. At first the customer was
required to show proof of employment and proof of a checking account. Id. Then
the customer was given a cash advance that he was required to payoff in the future.
Id. The court noted that all the advertisements for the Internet service provider
emphasized instant cash and were listed under loans in the Yellow Pages. Id. at 376.
A survey of customers indicated that they signed the Internet service contract solely
for the instant cash. Id. Further, no evidence was offered that any person had ever
patronized the store to obtain Internet service. Id.
90. Press Release, Roy Cooper, supra note 82, at 4.
91. Democratic Leadership Council, New Dem of the Week: Roy Cooper (May
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November of 2003.92 Other companies used the rent-a-charter or
agency method to continue operations. 93 These lenders partnered
with national banks in order to avoid state usury and consumer
protection laws. 94 For example, Dollar Financial Group, a payday
lender, entered into an agreement with Eagle National Bank
(ENB) of Upper Darby, Pennsylvania. 9 ENB was one of the most
notorious national banks offering its charter for rent.96 ENB was
so deeply involved in payday lending that almost half its profits
were a result of the payday lending industry. 97 From 1995 until
2001, ENB's payday lending volume increased by an enormous
$397 million. 98
Concerned that national banks were renting out their
charters, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
wrote an advisory letter "warning any national bank engaged in
payday lending to do so in a 'safe and sound manner."' 99 Because
ENB continued to operate its payday lending operation, the OCC
issued an enforcement action against the bank requiring it to sever
its relationship with payday lenders.1' ° In North Carolina,
12, 2003), http://www.ppionline.org/ndol/ndolci.cfm?kaid=104&subid=116&ontentid
251580. "James Crawford was buying consumers' property and then leasing it back
to them in exchange for loans of $50 to $300. In a typical transaction for a $300, 13month loan, a borrower would have to make bi-weekly payments of $54, plus $9 in
taxes. That adds up to a total payment of $1,764 -- equal to an annual percentage
rate of 480% -- on top of which, borrowers would have to pay an additional $300 at
the end of their lease term to buy back their property." Id.
92. Id.
93. In re Advance Am., Cash Advance Centers of N.C., Inc., No. 05:008:CF, 9
(Comm'r of Banks, Dec. 22, 2005) (order), available at http://www.nccob.org/
NR/rdonlyres/AF33D27C-2D74-40D5-88BE-E701BO31DDB4/0/43_AANCFINAL
ORDER122205.pdf.
94. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000); Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp.,
439 U.S. 299 (1978). The court, interpreting 12 U.S.C. § 85, held that a national bank
located in Nebraska could charge interest at the rates allowed under Nebraska law on
credit-card loans made to customers who resided in Minnesota, even though such
rates would be usurious under Minnesota law. Id.
95. Scott Shaaf, Note, Update on Payday Lending: State and National Regulators
are Getting Aggressive, Independent Study 7 (Mar. 18, 2002) (on file with N.C.
Banking Inst.).
96. Id.
97. Nicole Duran, OCC Orders Bank to Exit Payday Biz, AM. BANKER, Jan. 4,
2002.
98. Press Release, Comptroller of the Currency, Fact Sheet: Eagle National Bank
Consent Order 2 (Jan. 3, 2002), http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2002-01a.doc.
99. Shaaf, supra note 95, at 7.
100. Duran, supra note 97, at 1.
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Advance America, Cash Advance Centers of North Carolina, Inc.
(AANC) was partnered with People's National Bank of Paris,
Texas. I In early 2002, the OCC announced that it was filing
charges against People's National Bank "[for engaging] in unsafe
and unsound practices in connection with its payday lending
program." 10 2 Ultimately, AANC and People's National Bank
agreed to end their payday lending relationship and to pay
$175,000 in civil money penalties.0 3
After the OCC began aggressively regulating relationships
between national banks and payday lenders, many such lenders'
entered into agreements with banks chartered under state law.0
For example, immediately after AANC terminated its relationship
with People's National Bank, it entered into an agreement with
Republic Bank and Trust Company, which is a state bank
chartered under the laws of Kentucky.105 While AANC was under
contract with Republic Bank and Trust, the FDIC introduced
revised guidance procedures for payday lenders."' 6 The new
guidance procedures limited "the number of payday advances that
could be made to a customer in a year while allowing other
alternative long-term credit products, generally installment
loans."10 7

These changes caused AANC to terminate its relationship
with Republic Bank and Trust, and enter into an agreement with
First Fidelity Bank (FFB), a bank chartered under the laws of
South Dakota.' °8 FFB was authorized under South Dakota law to
make high interest installment loans.'0 9 "Republic was not
101. In re Advance Am., Cash Advance Centers of N.C., Inc., No. 05:008:CF, 6
(Comm'r of Banks, Dec. 22, 2005) (order), available at http://www.nccob.org/NR/
rdonlyres/AF33D27C-2D74-40D5-88BE-E701BO31DDB4/0/43_AANCFINALORD
ER122205.pdf.
102. Id. at 12.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 13.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 16.
107. In re Advance Am., Cash Advance Centers of N.C., Inc., No. 05:008:CF, 20
(Comm'r of Banks, Dec. 22, 2005) (order), available at http://www.nccob.org/NR/
rdonlyres/AF33D27C-2D74-40D5-88BE-E701BO31DDB4/0/43_AANCFINALORD
ER122205.pdf.
108. Id. at 19.
109. Id. at 21.
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authorized under Kentucky law to make high interest rate
installment loans comparable to the FFB installment loans at the
rates charged by FFB under South Dakota law," thus, AANC
replaced Republic Bank and Trust with FFB." ° AANC and other
payday lenders maintained these relationships until the North
Carolina Commissioner of Banks ended the rent-a-charter or
agency payday-lending model in North Carolina.1"
The pervasiveness of payday lending in North Carolina
mirrored that of the United States as a whole." 2 Some estimates
suggested that there were more than 1200 payday-lending outlets
located in North Carolina, which made up approximately ten
percent of all payday lending outlets in the United States.1 3 "In
1999, payday lenders in North Carolina originated more than 2.9
million transactions totaling more than $535 million, generating in
excess of $80 million dollars in fees ...and this excludes licensed

pawnbrokers in North Carolina who provide their own unique
brand of consumer credit."' 1 4 Put another way, there was one
payday lender in North Carolina for every two traditional banks,
and, in some counties, payday lenders outnumbered traditional
banks."5 The North Carolina Association of Check Cashers said
that customers in North Carolina visited payday lenders 654,000
times each month for a total of 7,859,000 times each year.116
IV. RENT-A-CHARTER PAYDAY LENDING COMES TO AN END IN
NORTH CAROLINA

On December 22, 2005, the North Carolina Commissioner
of Banks ended rent-a-charter or agency payday lending in North
Carolina." 7 The issue in In re Advance America, Cash Advance

110. Id.
111. Id. at 23.
112. Stegman, The Public Policy Challenges of Payday Lending, supra note 5, at
18.
113. Id. at 17.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Shaaf, supra note 95, at 2.
117. In re Advance Am., Cash Advance Centers of N.C., Inc., No. 05:008:CF, 5354 (Comm'r of Banks, Dec. 22, 2005) (order), available at http://www.nccob.org/NR/
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Centers of North Carolina, Inc., was whether payday lenders who
used the rent-a-charter or agency method of doing business
violated the North Carolina Consumer Finance Act (CFA). 1 One
such questionable lender was Defendant AANC." 9 AANC is a
wholly owned subsidiary of Advance America, Cash Advance
Centers, Inc., a Delaware corporation that is the largest payday
lending company in the United States.120 AANC had operated as
many as 118 payday lending stores in North Carolina. 1 From
October 31, 1997 until August 31, 2001, when payday lending was
statutorily authorized in North Carolina, AANC operated under
the standard business model. 122 After the sunset of the North
Carolina Check Cashing Act, AANC
continued to operate under
1 23
model.
agency
or
the rent-a-charter
A.

Issue 1: Is AANC Subject to the CFA?

In order for a company to be subject to the CFA, it must be
determined that it is (i) a person (ii) that is engaged in the business
of lending, (iii) which lending is in amounts of $10,000 or less. 24
The Commissioner found, and there was no dispute, that AANC
was a corporation and thus was a "person" within the meaning of
the CFA.1 25 The Commissioner then had to determine
whether
126
lending.'
of
business
the
in
"engaged
AANC was
There was significant dispute as to whether AANC was
"engaged in the business of lending" under the CFA.' The North
Carolina Attorney General contended that the statute should be
interpreted broadly, and under such an interpretation, AANC

rdonlyres/AF33D27C-2D74-40D5-88BE-E701BO31DDB4/0/43_AANCFINALORD
ER122205.pdf.
118. Id.; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-164 (2005).
119. In re Advance Am., No. 05:008:CF, at 2.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-166 (2005).
125. In re Advance Am., No. 05:008:CF, at 32.
126. Id.
127. See id.
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would be "engaged in the business of lending."''
AANC
contended that the CFA did not apply to AANC under the rent-acharter or agency model and should be interpreted stricly. 129 The
Commissioner, after reviewing the plain language of the CFA, the
intent of the General Assembly, and the legislative history,
determined that the scope of the CFA was "to be interpreted and
applied broadly."' 3 ° After an extensive review of the record, the
Commissioner held that AANC was "engaged in the business of
lending" in North Carolina because the sole purpose of AANC's
centers in North Carolina was for the origination, servicing and
processing of loans.'
The Commissioner determined that
AANC's small loans and advances fell within the CFA because the
borrower received cash or its equivalent in amounts less than
$10,000.132

B.

Issue 2: Has AANC Violated the CFA?

AANC violated the CFA if it received compensation in
amounts greater than allowed by North Carolina usury law,
Chapter 24.33 Under Chapter 24, unless AANC is a licensed
consumer finance lender, the maximum rate allowed on loans of
$25,000 or less is 16% per annum. 34 If AANC was a licensed
lender, then the maximum rate on loans less than $30,000 is 36%
for the first $600 and 15% on amounts greater than $600. After an
extensive review of AANC's agency relationship with its three outof-state partners, the Commissioner determined that AANC's
compensation for payday loans was much greater than allowed by
Chapter 24 of the CFA.'35 AANC typically received compensation
at an annual percentage rate of approximately 450%.136

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 33.
131. In re Advance Am., No. 05:008:CF, at 37.
132. Id. at 38.
133. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-166(a) (2005).
134. § 24-1.1.
135. In re Advance Am., No. 05:008:CF, at 39. AANC's relationship with Peoples
National Bank yielded interest rates of 443.21%. Id. at 9. AANC's relationship with
Republic Bank and Trust company yielded interest rates of 456.26%. Id. at 14.
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Issue 3: Is AANC Exempt from the CFA?

Lastly, the Commissioner was required to determine
whether AANC was exempt from the CFA by the terms of the
statute or because enforcement of the CFA against AANC was
preempted by federal law. 13 7 AANC argued that because G.S. §
53-190b 138 refers to agents of out-of-state lenders but does not state
that such agents are liable under the CFA, such agents are
therefore exempt from the statute.1 39 After reading the relevant
portions of the CFA, the Commissioner determined that
"subsection (b) of N.C. Gen. Stat §190 is a long-arm statute
intended to extend the State's jurisdiction to out-of-state lenders
when they
operate in North Carolina, either directly or through
140
agents."
AANC also contended that federal law and the U.S.
Constitution preempted enforcement of the CFA against
AANC.14 ' This argument rested on the concept that a state cannot
enforce a law that conflicts with the purpose of a federal law. 14
AANC based its claim for preemption on Section 27 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA). 43
"AANC argue[d] that
AANC's relationship with First Fidelity Bank yielded interest rates of 521.43%. Id.
at 21.
136. Id. at 14.
137. In re Advance Am., No. 05:008:CF, at 42.
138. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-190(b) (2005). "If any lender or agent of a lender who
makes loan contracts outside this state in the amount or of the value of ten thousand
dollars ($10,000) or less, comes into this State to solicit or otherwise conduct activities
in regard to such loan contracts, then such lender shall be subject to the requirements
of this article." Id.
139. Inre Advance Am., No. 05:008:CF, at 41.
140. Id. at 42.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. In re Advance Am., No. 05:008:CF, at 43.
In order to prevent discrimination against State-chartered insured
depository institutions . . . with respect to interest rates, if the
applicable rate prescribed in this subsection exceeds the rate such
State bank ... would be permitted to charge in the absence of this
subsection, such State bank . . .may, notwithstanding any State
constitution or statute which is hereby preempted for the purpose
of this section, take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or
discount made, or upon any other note, bill of exchange, or other
evidence of debt, interest at a rate of not more than 1 percentum
in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in
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enforcement of the CFA against it would frustrate the interstate
operations of the banks provided for by the FDIA."'" However,
the Commissioner noted that:
State law is not lightly set aside, especially in areas
typically regulated by state law, like banking and
consumer protection, unless Congress has shown a
clear intent to preempt the state law, either by
express language, by clear implication, or by a
federal agency acting within the authority given to it
by Congress.
Furthermore, the Commissioner found that the express
language of Section 27 of the FDIA refers to the protection of
banks, and neither of the state-charted banks AANC partnered
with to carry out business in North Carolina were parties to the
lawsuit. 46
AANC further argued that "it should gain the benefit of
federal preemption under Section 27 [of the FDIA] because the
banks were the true lenders of [a]dvance and [i]nstallment [1]oans
and AANC was only their agent, providing ministerial services in
connection with such advances and loans. '' 147 However, the
Commissioner reasoned that the relationships between AANC
and its partner banks do not fit the characterization as merely an
agency.14 1 "AANC and [its parent company] were the controlling
parties in all such relationships, [they] took the predominant share
of benefits of such relationships, and [they] changed partners
virtually at will to insure the maximum return to the [p]arent
[company].' 4 9 Ultimately, the Commissioner held that AANC

effect at the Federal Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve district
where such State bank ... is located or at the rate allowed by the
laws of the State... where the bank is located ....
12 U.S.C. 1831(d) (2000) (Section 27).
144. Id. at 42.
145. Id. at 43.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 44.
148. Id.
149. In re Advance Am., No. 05:008:CF, at 44.

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. I11

"failed to show that it is a person operating under the authority of
a federal banking law, or that any principles of federal preemption
of the CFA to [AANC's] operations in
control the application
150
North Carolina.,
" ' Essentially, AANC
AANC also made an estoppel claim.15
contended that because the Commissioner of Banks and the
Attorney General did not take legal action against AANC
immediately after the NCCCA expired, those two offices were
estopped from enforcing the law. 52 However, the Commissioner
held that because the offices did not receive any benefit from
AANC, they are not required to bear the burden of failing to
enforce the law. 53 Furthermore, the State cannot be estopped
from exercising a clear governmental function-enforcing the
law. 54
D.

Conclusion

After a review of all the evidence, the Commissioner55
determined that AANC was subject to the North Carolina CFA.1
Furthermore, AANC had consistently violated the CFA by
offering loans at rates radically higher than allowed by North
Carolina law. 56 The Commissioner also dismissed the claims that
AANC was exempt from the CFA based on federal preemption
principles and estoppel claims.'57 As such, AANC was ordered to
immediately cease and desist further payday operations in North
Any violation of the Commissioner's order could
Carolina.
result in civil penalties. 5 9 The Commissioner's ruling has
effectively ended rent-a-charter payday lending in North
Carolina.' 60
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 46.
Id. at 48.
Id.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 52.
In re Advance Am., No. 05:008:CF, at 53.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 53-54.
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V. THE COMMISSIONER'S OPINION: EXPANDING THE BANKWEST V.
BAKER ARGUMENT?

A.

BankWest v. Baker

In BankWest, the primary issue considered by the court was
whether a Georgia payday lending statute was preempted by the
FDIA.16' The Georgia Act "restricts in-state payday stores from
acting as agents for out-of-state banks in one, limited
circumstance: where the agency agreement grants the in-state
agent 'the predominant economic interest' in the bank's payday
loan, which.., means that the payday stores hold more than 50%
of the revenues from the loan."1 62 The state of Georgia enacted
this law to prevent in-state payday stores from circumventing
Georgia's usury laws.163
The plaintiffs in the case were two state banks chartered
under the laws of Delaware and South Dakota.' 64 Plaintiff banks
filed a lawsuit for a preliminary injunction enjoining application of
the new Georgia payday lending law. 65 Plaintiff banks had agents
in the state of Georgia who operated the payday-lending stores.166
"The agents set up retail locations in Georgia at which borrowers
could apply for payday loans, and the agents' duties were to
market and service the loans as well as to collect payment and
report to the banks providing the funds for the loan."' 67 Plaintiff
banks retained certain responsibilities such as setting "the terms of
the loan, including the loan amounts, fees and charges, interest
rates, repayment terms, credit limits, and credit standards." 1'6
Ultimately, the trial court concluded, and the appellate
court affirmed, that the Georgia payday lending statute was not
preempted by any federal legislation. 69 Specifically, the trial court

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F.3d 1289, 1301 (11th Cir. 2005).
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-17-2(b)(4) (2006).
BankWest, 411 F.3d at 1293.
Id.
Id. at 1299.
Id. at 1295.
Willoughby, supra note 74, at 280.

Id.
BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F.3d 1289, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005).
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held that there was "nothing in the federal banking laws or the
cases applying them that gives banks and their purported agents
the sole and exclusive right to define the nature of their
relationship and their transaction . . . for the sole purpose of

avoiding the application of state usury laws." ° The Georgia
payday lending statute allows out-of-state banks to export their
state's interest rates; however, it prohibits out-of-state banks from
using an agent who receives a predominant economic interest in
the loan.' 7' Out-of-state banks could potentially restructure their
agency relationships to comply with the Georgia statute and
continue providing payday loans
in Georgia at rates greater than
72
allowed by Georgia usury law.

B.

The North CarolinaCommissionerof Banks' Decision Taking BankWest One Step Further?

Some scholars have suggested that the decision in
BankWest is "likely to have an important impact on payday
lending in states across the country, as state lawmakers will likely
follow Georgia's lead in implementing statutes to effectively
outlaw such rent-a-charter practices within their borders.', 7 3 The

Commissioner's decision to end the rent-a-charter method of
payday lending appears to be a manifestation of this predicted
trend. The Commissioner appears to be expanding the BankWest
argument in a way that it could be used in states without the
Georgia statute and may have far-reaching effects in shutting
down the rent-a-charter business model used by payday lending
shops.
While not explicitly setting a "predominant economic
interest" standard, like the one used in BankWest, the
Commissioner used very similar language in describing the interest
of AANC versus the interest of the banks for which AANC was
acting as the purported agent. 7 4

The Commissioner stated,

170. BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1351 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
171. Ga. Code Ann. § 16-17-1(c) (2004).
172. BankWest, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1352.
173. Willoughby, supra note 74, at 286.
174. In re Advance Am., Cash Advance Centers of N.C., Inc., No. 05:008:CF, 28
(Comm'r of Banks, Dec. 22, 2005) (order), available at http://www.nccob.org/NR/
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"AANC continued its cash advance lending business in North
Carolina after the State's payday lending law expired by
'outsourcing' the funding and underwriting of its operations [to
Peoples National Bank] for a fee of just over 10% of the gross
revenue."'75 Furthermore, the Commissioner asserted that "[f]or
[AANC's] services under the agreement [with Republic Bank and
Trust], AANC received 67% of the revenue. ..,
As noted
earlier, the Commissioner felt that "AANC and [its parent
company] were the controlling parties in all such relationships,
[they] took the predominant share of benefits of such
relationships, and [they] changed partners virtually at will to insure
the maximum return to the [p]arent [company]."' 77
The Commissioner's opinion appears to go one step further
than the opinion in BankWest in constructing a framework for
ending the rent-a-charter method of payday lending. 178 The
strength of the Commissioner's opinion is that it does not rely on a
specific North Carolina payday lending statute to eliminate the
rent-a-charter method of payday lending, rather the Commissioner
looks to the North Carolina CFA. 179 The CFA was not enacted to
deal specifically with payday lenders; instead, it is a broad statute
dealing with all aspects of consumer finance. 8°
The
Commissioner's argument that the CFA forecloses an agent of an
out-of-state bank from importing interest rates into North
Carolina in excess of the state's usury laws seems to be on solid
ground."'
In a recent FDIC rulemaking proceeding, the FDIC
examined the issue of state law preemption under Sections 24(j)

rdonlyres/AF33D27C-2D74-40D5-88BE-E701BO31DDB4/0/43_AANCFINALORD
ER122205.pdf.
175. Id. at 12.
176. Id. at 14.
177. Id. at 44.
178. Id. at 53-54.
179. Id. at 46.
180. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-164 (2005).
181. In re Advance Am., Cash Advance Centers of N.C., Inc., No. 05:008:CF, 46
(Comm'r of Banks, Dec. 22, 2005) (order), available at http://www.nccob.org/NR/
rdonlyres/AF33D27C-2D74-40D5-88BE-E701BO31DDB4//43_AANCFINALORD
ER122205.pdf.
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and 27 of the FDIA. 18' Based on this proceeding, the FDIC issued
a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking limited to implementation of
FDIA Section 24(j) and Section 27.
The Commissioner found,
"[t]he proposed rule with regard to Section 27 applies to banks
and, by reference to OCC interpretations, to operating subsidiaries
of banks. It does not refer at all to agents or other affiliated
parties of banks. ' 4 Ultimately the Commissioner concluded,
"[that] the FDIC . . . when presented with the opportunity to

officially interpret the preemptive effect of-federal law generally,
and Section 27 in particular, has not extended such preemption to
third party providers such as AANC."'85
By not specifically setting a "predominant economic
interest" standard, the Commissioner's decision may make it
difficult, if not impossible, for out-of-state banks to restructure
their agency relationships in such a way as to continue lending in
North Carolina in excess of North Carolina usury law.1 6 In
BankWest, the state statute left open the possibility that out-ofstate banks could restructure their relationships with in-state
agents so as to continue lending in Georgia at interest rates above
what is allowed by state usury laws.1'8 Even so, the new payday
lending structure in Georgia is much less attractive to in-state
agents because the agents must keep less than 50% of the profit. 88
The Commissioner, by relying on the North Carolina CFA, takes a
more hard-line stand against payday lending.19 By finding that
agents of out-of-state banks are subject to the North Carolina
CFA, there is no way in which in-state agents can restructure their
182. Id. at 45.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 46.
185. Id. at 45.
186. Id. at 12, 14, 22. The Commissioner never states a specific "predominant
economic interest" standard like the standard used in Georgia. Ga. Code. Ann. § 1617-2(b)(4) (2006). However, the Commissioner notes the economic interest AANC
retains in all its relationships with out-of-state banks. In re Advance Am., No.
05:008:CF, at 12, 14, 22.
187. BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
188. Willoughby, supra note 74, at 285.
189. In re Advance Am., No. 05:008:CF, at 53. The Commissioner does not rely on
a specific North Carolina payday lending statute. Id. Rather, the Commissioner
finds that agents of out-of-state payday lenders must abide by the North Carolina
Consumer Finance Act. Id.
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relationships with out-of-state banks to avoid North Carolina
usury limits. 9°
Many states already limit payday lending practices by
banks within their borders.'91 The Commissioner's decision creates
a framework by which other states can reach out-of-state banks
and end the rent-a-charter method of payday lending without
having to engage in the onerous legislative process 92 Other states
could follow North Carolina's lead and end the rent-a-charter
method of payday lending by holding that agents of out-of-state
banks are subject to state consumer finance laws.'93 Similar
interpretations by other states will effectively shut down the renta-charter method of payday
• 194 lending and will result in a more
society.
healthy
economically
VI. CONCLUSION

The payday lending industry in the United States was once
a massive business.' 95 However, the high-risk nature of the short
term credit industry and the potential for abuse has led to more
restrictions on payday lending.196 The payday lending industry has

seen a storm of both federal and state regulations.'97
On
December 22, 2005, the North Carolina Commissioner of Banks
effectively ended payday lending in North Carolina 98 The
190. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-190 (2005). "If any lender or agent of a lender who
makes loan contracts outside this State in the amount or of the value of ten thousand
dollars ($10,000) or less, comes into this State to solicit or otherwise conduct activities
in regard to such loan contracts, then such lender shall be subject to the requirements
of this Article." Id.
191. Erik Eckholm, Seductively Easy, 'Payday Loans' Often Snowball, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 2006, at Al. Payday lending is banned in 11 states. Id.
192. See In re Advance Am., Cash Advance Centers of N.C., Inc., No. 05:008:CF,
32-53 (Comm'r of Banks, Dec. 22, 2005) (order), available at http://www.nccob.org/
NR/rdonlyres/AF33D27C-2D74-40D5-88BE-E701BO31DDB4/0/43_AANCFINALO
RDER122205.pdf. Other states could prevent the rent-a-charter method of payday
lending by requiring in-state agents of out-of-states banks to comply with state
consumer finance laws. Id. This method would be less burdensome than proposing
and enacting a payday lending specific statute. Id.
193. See id. at 32-38.
194. NAT'L ENDOWMENT FOR FIN. EDUC., supra note 29.
195. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
198. In re Advance Am., Cash Advance Centers of N.C., Inc., No. 05:008:CF, 53-
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Commissioner's opinion can be viewed as yet another wave in the
changing tide of payday lending regulation.199 Ultimately, the
Commissioner's opinion provides a framework by which other
states may limit the rent-a-charter method of payday lending
within their borders without having to engage in the arduous
legislative process.2 0
Following the state of Georgia's lead, the Commissioner
expanded the BankWest v. Baker argument and ended payday
lending in North Carolina by holding that in-state agents of out-ofstate banks are subject to North Carolina consumer finance laws. 1
The novelty of the Commissioner's argument is that it does not
require a specific anti-payday lending statute in order to end
payday lending.20 2 Rather, states simply need to hold that payday
lenders are subject to general consumer finance laws. 20 3
Furthermore, states that choose to rely on their own consumer
finance laws to end the rent-a-charter method of payday lending
are unlikely to be preempted by federal law because in-state
20
payday lenders are not merely agents of out-of state banks°.
Rather, in-state payday lenders conduct all of the business and
reap 90% or more of the profits from the payday lending
operation.205
Payday lending continues to survive unregulated in 39
states. 206 If these states follow North Carolina's lead and interpret
their consumer finance laws to reach in-state agents, in-state
payday lenders will be forced to end their relationships with outof-state banks. 7 Without the ability to import interest rates in
54 (Comm'r of Banks, Dec. 22, 2005) (order), available at http://www.nccob.org/NR/
rdonlyres/AF33D27C-2D74-40D5-88BE-E701BO31DDB4/0/43_AANCFINALORD
ER122205.pdf.
199. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
200. See In re Advance Am., No. 05:008:CF, at 29-52.
201. Id. at 53-54.
202. In re Advance Am., No. 05:008:CF, at 29-52. In BankWest, the state of
Georgia relied on Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-17-1 - 16-17-10 (2004), a specific payday
lending statute, in order to limit payday lending in Georgia. BankWest v. Baker, 411
F.3d 1289, 1296 (2005).
203. Id. at 53-54.
204. See supra notes 137-154 and accompanying text.
205. In re Advance Am., No. 05:008:CF, at 12.
206. Erik Eckholm, supra note 191, at Al.
207. See In re Advance Am., No. 05:008:CF, at 53-54.
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excess of state usury laws, payday lending becomes significantly
less profitable.2l With less profit, many payday lenders are "likely
to find it economically infeasible to continue operating., 20 9
Evidenced by the size of the payday lending industry, there
was significant demand for short-term credit to manage the
The
monetary problems of people with few assets.210
Commissioner's ruling, ending payday lending in North Carolina,
a source of short-term credit for cash-strapped
has removed
211
Traditional banks can fill the short-term credit void
consumers.
by offering credit to consumers in a socially responsible fashion.2
Thus, the Commissioner's decision to end the rent-a-charter
method of payday lending will have positive consequences for
individual consumers213 and traditional banks. 4 Furthermore,
ending payday lending and bringing check cashers into the
financial mainstream has important implications for "long-term
family self-sufficiency" and the financial well-being of our society
as a whole.2 5
SCOT" A. HEFNER

208. See Willoughby, supra note 74, at 287.
209. Id.
210. See Stegman, The Public Policy Challenges of Payday Lending, supra note 5,
at 19.
211. See Erick Bergquist, NC Order Puts Payday Firm in Limbo, AM. BANKER,
Dec. 27, 2005.
212. See Stegman, The Public Policy Challenges of Payday Lending, supra note 5,
at 21.
213.

NAT'L ENDOWMENT FOR FIN. EDUC., supra note 29.

Payday loans have a

reputation for creating a relentless debt cycle that many consumers are unable to
break. Id.
214. See Stegman, The Public Policy Challenges of Payday Lending, supra note 5,
at 21. "The prolific growth and profitability of [payday lending] reflect the fact that
mainstream financial institutions have failed to meet the demand for short-term
credit by working people who already have banking relationships. Moral obligations
aside, banks,... and credit unions have a real market opportunity to 'reach out to
these consumers and provide responsible services for their legitimate needs."' Id.
"FDIC-insured institutions could receive Community Reinvestment Act credit for
offering [short-term credit] products." Joe Adler, In Brief: FDIC Offers Guidelines
on Short-Term Loans, AM. BANKER, Dec. 5,2006.
215. Stegman, Banking the Unbanked, supra note 63, at 23.
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